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Abstract
In this study, we analyze the e¤ects of a decrease in unskilled labor in China on
the direction of innovation in the US by incorporating production o¤shoring into a
North-South model of directed technical change. We nd that if o¤shoring is present
(absent) in equilibrium, then a decrease in unskilled labor in the South would lead to
skill-biased (unskill-biased) technical change in the North. This nding highlights the
di¤erent implications of o¤shoring and conventional trade on innovation. Furthermore,
we nd that an increase in the Southern stock of capital reduces o¤shoring and also
leads to skill-biased technical change. Therefore, rapid capital accumulation and a
decrease in unskilled labor in China could both lead to a rising skill premium in the
US. Calibrating the model to China-US data, we nd that a 1% decrease in unskilled
labor (1% increase in capital) in China leads to a 0.8% (0.6%) increase in the skill
premium in the US under a moderate elasticity of substitution between skill-intensive
and labor-intensive goods.
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1 Introduction
After three decades of economic development, China is now experiencing a rapid decrease in
unskilled labor. For example, according to the Barro-Lee dataset on education attainment,
the share of population (over the age of 25) in China without completion of secondary
education decreased from 93.4% in 1980 to 53.7% in 2010. As a result of this dramatic
decrease in unskilled labor in China, wages have been rising rapidly. For example, it is not
uncommon for manufacturing plants in China to experience rising wages of 20% per year.1
Given this rapidly rising wages, China is becoming a less attractive place for the o¤shoring of
manufacturing activities. A recent article of The Economist documents a decreasing trend
in production o¤shoring from developed economies to China;2 for example, "[t]he Boston
Consulting Group reckons that in areas such as transport, computers, fabricated metals and
machinery, 10-30% of the goods that America now imports from China could be made at
home by 2020". The article also argues that this decreasing trend is due to changes in the
manufacturing process in developed economies such as the digitization of manufacturing;3
as a result of which, "companies now want to be closer to their customers so that they can
respond more quickly to changes in demand. And some products are so sophisticated that
it helps to have the people who design them and the people who make them in the same
place." In other words, this new manufacturing process is relatively skill-intensive.
In this study, we analyze the e¤ects of a decrease in unskilled labor in China on the
direction of innovation in the US by incorporating production o¤shoring into a North-South
model of directed technical change. We nd that if the equilibrium features o¤shoring, then
a decrease in unskilled labor in the South would lead to skill-biased technical change in
the North. In contrast, if the equilibrium does not feature o¤shoring, then a decrease in
Southern unskilled labor would lead to unskill-biased technical change. Intuitively, when
o¤shoring is absent in equilibrium, a reduction in the supply of unskilled labor in the South
causes through international trade a price e¤ect that improves incentives of innovation for
labor-intensive goods. When o¤shoring is present in equilibrium, a reduction in the supply
of unskilled labor in the South causes also a market size e¤ect that improves incentives
of innovation for skill-intensive goods. This nding highlights the di¤erent implications of
o¤shoring and conventional trade on the direction of technological progress.
The above theoretical result has the following implications. When China rst opened up
its economy for international trade in the 1980s, there was essentially no o¤shoring to the
economy. Together with a low level of patent protection in China at that time,4 the opening
of the Chinese economy implies a massive increase in the supply of unskilled labor in the
world causing predominantly a price e¤ect that improves incentives of innovation directed to
the relatively scarce factor, i.e., skilled labors,5 and this contributes to skill-biased technical
1The Economist, "The End of Cheap China", March 10, 2012.
2The Economist, "The Third Industrial Revolution", April 21, 2012.
3An important technology under the digitization of manufacturing is 3D printing, "which creates a solid
object by building up successive layers of material. The digital design can be tweaked with a few mouseclicks.
The 3D printer can run unattended, and can make many things which are too complex for a traditional factory
to handle."
4For example, the Ginarte-Park index of patent rights in China was 1.33 in 1985; see Park (2008). The
Ginarte-Park index is on a scale of 0 to 5, and a larger number implies stronger patent rights.
5From 1980 to 1995, the share of population in China with at least completion of secondary education
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change in developed countries. After the mid 1990s, the amount of o¤shoring to China
started to increase rapidly. Together with an increased level of patent protection in China,6
the decrease in unskilled labor in China causes mainly a market size e¤ect that improves
incentives of innovation directed to the now relatively abundant factor, i.e., skilled labors,7
and this also contributes to skill-biased technical change in developed countries.
Another stylized fact of economic development in China is that capital investment as a
share of gross domestic product (GDP) is about 40% and substantially higher than many
developed economies. So long as the depreciation rates of capital are not substantially
di¤erent across countries, China is accumulating capital at a much faster rate than developed
countries. From our theoretical analysis, we nd that an increase in the stock of capital in
the South relative to the North would reduce o¤shoring. Intuitively, a larger stock of capital
in China increases the wage rates of Chinese workers rendering o¤shoring to China less
attractive. As a result, a larger stock of capital in the South also leads to skill-biased technical
change in the North. Therefore, both the stylized facts of rapid capital accumulation and a
decrease in unskilled labor in China could contribute to skill-biased technical change in the
US.
We calibrate the model to China-US data to provide a quantitative analysis. Due to skill-
biased technical change, either a decrease in unskilled labor or an increase in capital stock in
the South would raise the skill premium in the North. The magnitude of the changes depends
on the elasticity of substitution between skill-intensive and labor-intensive goods. We nd
that a 1% decrease in the supply of unskilled labor in China leads to a 0.8% (3.7%) increase
in the skill premium in the US when the elasticity of substitution is 2.2 (2.4). Furthermore, a
1% increase in the capital stock in China leads to a 0.6% (2.0%) increase in the skill premium
in the US when the elasticity of substitution is 2.2 (2.4).
This paper relates to studies on directed technical change, such as Acemoglu (1998, 2002,
2003), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) and Gancia and Bonglioli (2008). These inuential
studies built on the literature of R&D-driven economic growth to analyze the direction of
innovation.8 Acemoglu (1998, 2002) analyzes skill-biased technical change and the rising
skill premium in the US, whereas Acemoglu (2003), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) and
Gancia and Bonglioli (2008) analyze the implications of trade on skill-biased technical
change and productivity di¤erences across countries. However, the abovementioned studies
do not consider o¤shoring. This paper also relates to studies on o¤shoring; see Grossman
and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) for a recent contribution and their discussion of earlier studies.
The present paper complements these two branches of literature by providing an analysis on
the e¤ects of o¤shoring on the direction of technological progress.
A recent study by Acemoglu et al. (2012) also analyzes the e¤ects of o¤shoring on skill-
biased technical change. In addition to some di¤erences in modelling details, our study di¤ers
from their interesting analysis by exploring a di¤erent set of research questions. Acemoglu et
al. (2012) analyze the e¤ects of an o¤shoring-cost parameter and a patent-policy parameter
was on average 13.7%; see the Barro-Lee dataset on educational attainment.
6The Ginarte-Park index of patent rights in China was 4.08 in 2005; see Park (2008).
7From 2000 to 2010, the share of population in China with at least completion of secondary education
was on average 39.5%; see the Barro-Lee dataset.
8See Romer (1990), Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991a) and Aghion and Howitt
(1992) for seminal studies in this literature and Gancia and Zilibotti (2005) for a survey.
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on skill-biased technical change, whereas we analyze the e¤ects of a decrease in unskilled labor
and an increase in capital on skill-biased technical change through o¤shoring. Therefore, we
believe that our study provides a useful complementary analysis to Acemoglu et al. (2012)
on this unchartered area of o¤shoring and directed technological progress.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 analyzes the e¤ects of labor supply and capital stock in the South on the direction of
innovation in the North. The nal section concludes.
2 A North-South model of directed technical change
In this section, we consider a North-South version of the model of directed technical change
based on Acemoglu (2002). The innovation process is in the form of variety expansion.
When an R&D entrepreneur invents a new variety, her patents generate monopolistic prots
in the Northern market and possibly also in the Southern market depending on the level of
patent protection in the South. For simplicity, we assume that both countries have access
to the same set of varieties of goods.9 Final goods are produced using skill-intensive and
labor-intensive goods, which are freely traded across countries, but capital and labors as
well as the intermediate inputs that capital produces are immobile across countries. As is
common in the literature, we model o¤shoring as "shadow migration" of workers through
which the output of o¤shored workers in the South is combined with intermediate inputs in
the North. As for the cost of o¤shoring, we follow Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) to
assume that o¤shoring involves a variable cost.10
2.1 Households
In the North, there is a representative household with the following lifetime utility function.
U =
1Z
0
e t lnCnt dt, (1)
where Cnt denotes consumption in the North at time t, and  > 0 is the subjective discount
rate. The household maximizes utility subject to the following asset-accumulation equation.
_Ant = rtA
n
t + w
n
h;tH
n + wnl;tL
n + qnt K
n   Cnt . (2)
Ant is the amount of nancial assets in the form of patents owned by the household, and rt
is the rate of return.11 Hn and Ln are respectively the inelastic supply of high-skilled and
9See for example Grossman and Helpman (1991b), Helpman (1993) and Lai (1998) for an alternative
branch of North-South models that focus on the gradual transfer of technologies from the North to the
South.
10See Acemoglu et al. (2012) for an interesting formulation of o¤shoring that involves a xed cost.
11rt is not indexed by a superscript because we assume that there is a global nancial market, and our
derivations are robust any distribution of nancial assets across the two countries. One special case is that
all nancial assets are owned by the Northern household.
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low-skilled labors. wnh;t and w
n
l;t are respectively the wage rates of high-skilled and low-skilled
labors. Kn is the inelastic supply of capital,12 and qnt is the rental price of capital. From
standard dynamic optimization, the familiar Euler equation is
_Cnt
Cnt
= rt   . (3)
As for the South, there are analogous conditions. Finally, we assume that the North is
more skill-abundant than the South (i.e., Hn=Ln > Hs=Ls) and that the North is also more
capital-abundant than the South (i.e., Kn=Ln > Ks=Ls).13
2.2 Final goods
The production of nal goods is perfectly competitive; therefore, it does not matter where
production takes place. Final goods are produced with the following CES aggregator.
Yt =
h

 
Y nl;t + Y
s
l;t
(" 1)="
+ (1  )  Y nh;t + Y sh;t(" 1)="i"=(" 1) , (4)
where Y nl;t and Y
s
l;t are respectively labor-intensive goods produced in the North and in the
South, and Y nh;t and Y
s
h;t are respectively skill-intensive goods produced in the North and in
the South. " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between the two types of goods,14 and 
determines their relative importance. fY nl;t; Y sl;t; Y nh;t; Y sh;tg are freely traded across countries
subject to international prices fPl;t; Ph;tg. The standard price index of nal goods is
1 =

" (Pl;t)
1 " + (1  )" (Ph;t)1 "
1=(1 ")
, (5)
where we have set the price of nal goods (numeraire) to one. The resource constraint on
nal goods is
Yt = Rt + C
n
t + C
s
t , (6)
where Rt is the global amount of nal goods devoted to R&D.
2.3 Labor-intensive goods
In the South, the production function of labor-intensive goods is
Y sl;t =
(lst )

1  
Z Nl;t
0
[xsl;t(i)]
1 di

(Nl;t)
1 , (7)
where  > ("   2)=("   1) determines the elasticity of substitution between intermediate
inputs. lst is the amount of Southern unskilled labor employed in the production of Y
s
l;t.
12We di¤er from Acemoglu (2002) by assuming that intermediate goods are produced using capital instead
of nal goods. This modication allows us to analyze the e¤ects of changes in the supply of capital. For
simplicity, we focus on an inelastic supply of capital; see the conclusion for a discussion of this assumption.
13See for example, Bai et al. (2006) for a discussion on the relatively low capital-labor ratio in China.
14See Acemoglu (2003) for a discussion of evidence for " > 1.
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In addition to using labor, the production of Y sl;t requires di¤erentiated intermediate inputs
xnl;t(i) for i 2 [0; Nl;t], where Nl;t is the number of di¤erentiated inputs for labor-intensive
goods that have been invented as of time t. The term (Nl;t)1  captures an externality e¤ect
of Nl;t on the production of Y sl;t in order to ensure a balanced growth path along which Nl;t
and Y sl;t grow at the same rate.
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In the North, the production function of labor-intensive goods is given by
Y nl;t =
(lnt + l
s
t)

1  
Z Nl;t
0
[xnl;t(i)]
1 di

(Nl;t)
1 , (8)
where lst is the amount of Southern unskilled labor employed by Northern rms to produce
Y nl;t capturing the o¤shoring of production. Following Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008),
we use a parameter  2 (0; 1) to capture the variable cost of o¤shoring. A higher cost of
o¤shoring is reected by a smaller value of . If  = 0, then o¤shoring of labor-intensive
goods would be absent,16 and the model is left with conventional trade in fY nl;t; Y sl;t; Y nh;t; Y sh;tg.
We refer to a larger  as a higher degree of o¤shoring. As a result of o¤shoring, the resource
constraint for Southern unskilled labor is lst + l
s
t = L
s, whereas the resource constraint for
Northern unskilled labor is lnt = L
n.
2.4 Skill-intensive goods
In the South, the production function of skill-intensive goods is given by
Y sh;t =
(hst)

1  
Z Nh;t
0
[xsh;t(j)]
1 dj

(Nh;t)
1 . (9)
hst is the amount of Southern skilled labor employed in the production of Y
s
h;t. In addition
to using labor, the production of Y sh;t requires di¤erentiated intermediate inputs x
n
h;t(j) for
j 2 [0; Nh;t], where Nh;t is the number of di¤erentiated inputs for skill-intensive goods that
have been invented as of time t. The term (Nh;t)1  captures an externality e¤ect of Nh;t on
the production of Y sh;t in order to ensure a balanced growth path along which Nh;t and Y
s
h;t
grow at the same rate.
In the North, the production function of labor-intensive goods is given by
Y nh;t =
(hnt )

1  
Z Nh;t
0
[xnh;t(j)]
1 dj

(Nh;t)
1 , (10)
where we have ruled out o¤shoring of skill-intensive goods.17 Due to the absence of o¤shoring
for skill-intensive goods, the resource constraint for Southern skilled labor is hst = H
s,
whereas the resource constraint for Northern skilled labor is hnt = H
n.
15In Acemoglu (2002), this externality is not needed because xnl;t(i) is produced from nal goods, whereas
xnl;t(i) is produced from a xed supply of capital in the present study.
16In fact, we nd that if  is below a threshold value, then o¤shoring would be absent in equilibrium.
17We have found that if and only if a knife-edge condition holds such that the costs of o¤shoring for
labor-intensive and skill-intensive goods are the same (i.e., h = l =  > 0), then the model would feature
o¤shoring in both sectors. Given that our focus is on the o¤shoring of labor-intensive goods, we consider
the case of 0  h < l =  under which the equilibrium features zero o¤shoring of skill-intensive goods and
is identical to the case of h = 0.
6
2.5 Intermediate inputs
For notational convenience, we suppress the index i 2 [0; Nl;t] for the intermediate inputs of
labor-intensive goods and the index j 2 [0; Nh;t] for the intermediate inputs of skill-intensive
goods. In the North, the production function of each di¤erentiated intermediate input is
xnz;t = k
n
z;t, (11)
where z 2 fh; lg. In other words, one unit of capital produces one unit of intermediate
input. Given the capital-rental price qnt in the North, the monopolistic producer of each
di¤erentiated intermediate input charges a prot-maximizing markup n over qnt such that
pnz;t = 
nqnt , (12)
where z 2 fh; lg and n = 1=(1  ) > 1. Therefore, the amount of prot captured by each
intermediate input in the North is
nz;t = (1  1=n)pnz;txnz;t = pnz;txnz;t, (13)
where z 2 fh; lg. Due to symmetry, the resource constraint on capital in the North is
Nl;tx
n
l;t +Nh;tx
n
h;t = K
n
l;t +K
n
h;t = K
n.
In the South, the production function of each di¤erentiated intermediate input is
xsz;t = k
s
z;t, (14)
where z 2 fh; lg. Given the capital-rental price qst in the South, the monopolistic producer
of each di¤erentiated intermediate input charges a markup s over qst such that
psz;t = 
sqst , (15)
where z 2 fh; lg. Here we follow Goh and Olivier (2002) to model incomplete patent protec-
tion that constrains the markup in the South;18 specically, we assume that s = 1=(1 ) 
n where  2 [0; ]. Intuitively, the presence of potential imitation due to incomplete patent
protection forces the monopolistic producers to lower their markup in the South. If  = 
( = 0), then patent protection is complete (zero) in the South. The amount of prot
captured by each intermediate input in the South is
sz;t = (1  1=s)psz;txsz;t = psz;txsz;t, (16)
where z 2 fh; lg. The resource constraint on capital in the South is Nl;txsl;t + Nh;txsh;t =
Ksl;t +K
s
h;t = K
s.
18See also Li (2001), Chu (2011) and Iwaisako and Futagami (2013).
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2.6 R&D
There is a continuum of entrepreneurs investing in R&D, and the invention of a new variety
of skill-intensive or labor-intensive inputs requires  units of nal goods. If  is the same
across the two countries, then the location of R&D is indeterminate, and our derivations
are robust to any geographical distribution of R&D. If  is smaller in the North than in
the South, then innovation takes place only in the North as in for example, Acemoglu and
Zilibotti (2001) and Gancia and Bonglioli (2008).19 When an entrepreneur invents a new
variety, she obtains patents in both the North and the South.20 The innovation process is
_Nz;t = Rz;t=, (17)
where z 2 fh; lg. Suppose we denote Vz;t as the value of an invention. Free entry ensures
that
(Vz;t   ) _Nz;t = 0, (18)
where z 2 fh; lg. The familiar Bellman equation is
rt =
nz;t + 
s
z;t + _Vz;t
Vz;t
, (19)
where z 2 fh; lg. Intuitively, the Bellman equation equates the interest rate to the asset
return per unit of asset, where the asset return is the sum of monopolistic prots nz;t + 
s
z;t
and any potential capital gain _Vz;t.
2.7 Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of prices frt; wnl;t; wsl;t; wnh;t; wsh;t; qnt ; qst ; Pl;t; Ph;t; pnl;t(i); psl;t(i);
pnh;t(j); p
s
h;t(j)g and a time path of allocations fRl;t; Rh;t; Cnt ; Cst ; Yt; Y nl;t; Y sl;t; Y nh;t; Y sh;t; xnl;t(i);
xsl;t(i); x
n
h;t(j); x
s
h;t(j); l
n
t ; l
s
t ; l
s
t ; h
n
t ; h
s
tg. Also, at each instance of time, the followings hold:
 Households maximize utility taking frt; wnl;t; wnh;t; qnt ; wsl;t; wsh;t; qstg as given;
 Competitive nal-goods rms produce fYtg to maximize prot taking prices fPl;t; Ph;tg
as given;
 Competitive labor-intensive goods rms in the two countries produce fY nl;t; Y sl;tg to
maximize prot taking the international price fPl;tg as given;
 Competitive skill-intensive goods rms in the two countries produce fY nh;t; Y sh;tg to max-
imize prot taking the international price fPh;tg as given;
 Monopolistic intermediate-goods rms in the labor-intensive sector produce fxnl;t(i); xsl;t(i)g
and choose fpnl;t(i); psl;t(i)g to maximize prot taking prices fqnt ; qstg as given;
19See Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) for a discussion of evidence that 90% of global R&D is performed in
OECD countries and 35% in the US.
20It is useful to note that given the global nancial market, patents that are based on a variety invented
in the North (South) are not necessarily solely owned by Northern (Southern) households.
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 Monopolistic intermediate-goods rms in the skill-intensive sector produce fxnh;t(j); xsh;t(j)g
and choose fpnh;t(j); psh;t(j)g to maximize prot taking prices fqnt ; qstg as given;
 R&D rms choose fRl;t; Rh;tg to maximize prot taking fVh;t; Vl;tg as given;
 The market-clearing condition for unskilled labor in the two countries holds such that
lnt = L
n and lst + l
s
t = L
s;
 The market-clearing condition for skilled labor in the two countries holds such that
hnt = H
n and hst = H
s;
 The market-clearing condition for capital in the two countries holds such that Nl;txnl;t+
Nh;tx
n
h;t = K
n and Nl;txsl;t +Nh;tx
s
h;t = K
s;
 The market-clearing condition for nal goods holds such that Yt = Rl;t+Rh;t+Cnt +Cst .
2.8 Balanced growth equilibrium
In this subsection, we discuss the balanced growth equilibrium of the model. The model
features a unique steady-state value of Nh;t=Nl;t. If the initial value of Nh;t=Nl;t is above
(below) this steady-state value, then the equilibrium initially features R&D in labor-intensive
(skill-intensive) goods only until the economy reaches the balanced growth path along which
Nh;t and Nl;t grow at the same rate. On the balanced growth path, the equilibrium features
a positive amount of o¤shoring if and only if  is su¢ ciently large. We summarize these
results in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The dynamics of Nh;t=Nl;t is characterized by global stability such that the
economy converges to a unique and stable balanced growth path along which Nh;t and Nl;t
grow at the same rate. If and only if  > [(Ks=Ls)=(Kn=Ln)]1 , then the equilibrium would
feature a positive amount of o¤shoring (i.e., ls > 0).
Proof. See Appendix A.
The threshold value of  above which the equilibrium features o¤shoring is given by
[(Ks=Ls)=(Kn=Ln)]1  < 1. Intuitively, in the presence of o¤shoring, the wage rate of
unskilled labor in the South must be a fraction  of that in the North. However, if the
capita-labor ratio in the South is su¢ ciently high relative to the North, then it would be
impossible for the South to have such a low relative wage in equilibrium.
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3 How the South a¤ects innovation in the North
In this section, we analyze the e¤ects of a reduction in the supply of Southern unskilled labor
Ls and an increase in Southern capital stock Ks on the direction of Northern innovation. In
Section 3.1, we analyze a special case of zero patent protection in the South (i.e.,  = 0).
In Section 3.2, we analyze another special case of complete patent protection in the South
(i.e.,  = ). In Section 3.3, we analyze the general case of incomplete patent protection in
the South (i.e., 0 <  < ).
3.1 Zero patent protection in the South
Here we sketch out the results in the main text and relegate the detailed derivations to
Appendix A. We focus on the balanced growth path and omit the time subscript for con-
venience. From (8) and (10), one can derive the following conditional demand functions for
xnl (i) and x
n
h(j).
xnl (i) =

Pl(Nl)
1 
pnl (i)
1=
(ln + ls), (20)
xnh(j) =

Ph(Nh)
1 
pnh(j)
1=
hn. (21)
Under the special case of zero patent protection (i.e.,  = 0) in the South, the steady-state
version of (19) simplies to
Vh
Vl
=
nh
nl
=
pnh
pnl
xnh
xnl
, (22)
where pnh = p
n
l = 
nqn. Substituting (20) and (21) into (22) yields
Vh
Vl
=

Nh
Nl
(1 )= 
Ph
Pl
1=
| {z }
price e¤ect
Hn
Ln + ls| {z }
market size e¤ect
. (23)
The above expression is similar to the one in Acemoglu (2002) except for the terms ls
and (Nh=Nl)
(1 )=, which captures the externality e¤ect. A decrease in Southern unskilled
labor Ls reduces the o¤shoring ls of labor-intensive goods. Therefore, we obtain the following
intuition from (23). When o¤shoring is absent (i.e., ls = 0), a reduction in the supply of
Southern unskilled labor Ls leads to only a negative price e¤ect by decreasing Ph=Pl. As
a result, Vh=Vl decreases causing innovation to be directed towards labor-intensive goods.
However, when o¤shoring is present (i.e., ls > 0), a reduction in the supply of Southern
unskilled labor Ls leads to also a positive market size e¤ect by increasing Hn=(Ln+ ls). As
a result, Vh=Vl increases causing innovation to be directed towards skill-intensive goods, and
this gives rise to skill-biased technical change (i.e., Nh=Nl increases). We summarize this
main result in Proposition 2.
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Proposition 2 If the equilibrium features a positive amount of o¤shoring, then a decrease
(an increase) in the supply of Southern unskilled labor Ls would lead to skill-biased (unskill-
biased) technical change. If the equilibrium does not feature o¤shoring, then a decrease (an
increase) in the supply of Southern unskilled labor Ls would lead to unskill-biased (skill-
biased) technical change.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition of this result can be explained as follows. Without o¤shoring, any change
in the supply of unskilled labor in the South causes only a price e¤ect on the value of
inventions. In this case, the market size e¤ect is absent due to zero (or more generally, weak)
patent protection in the South, so that production in the South generates zero monopolistic
prot (or more generally, a small amount of prot). With o¤shoring, some Southern workers
are hired to work with Northern intermediate inputs that are protected by complete patent
protection. As a result, a change in the supply of Southern unskilled labor causes through
o¤shoring an additional market size e¤ect on the value of inventions, and this result is
consistent with the nding in Acemoglu (2003) under complete Southern patent protection
without o¤shoring. In other words, Southern patent protection and o¤shoring serve as two
substitutable channels through which the supply of unskilled labor in the South causes a
market size e¤ect on the value of inventions in the North.
The result in Proposition 2 has the following implications. First, the opening of the
Chinese economy for international trade in the 1980s implies a massive increase in the
supply of unskilled labor and causes skilled-biased technical change because there was very
little o¤shoring to China at that time. Second, the substantial amount of o¤shoring to
China in the present implies that a decrease of unskilled labor in China would also lead to
skill-biased technical change.
From (7) and (8), one can derive the following conditional demand functions for ls and
ln.
wsl =
PlNl
1  

Ksl
ls
1 
, (24)
wnl =
PlNl
1  

Knl
ln + ls
1 
, (25)
where we have applied symmetry on xsl (i) = x
s
l = K
s
l =Nl and x
n
l (i) = x
n
l = K
n
l =Nl. A larger
Ks leads to an increase in Ksl ; as a result, w
s
l increases holding other variables constant.
Given that the equality wsl = w
n
l must hold when o¤shoring is present (i.e., l
s > 0), we have
Ksl
Ls   ls
1 
= 

Knl
Ln + ls
1 
, (26)
where we have used ls + ls = Ls and ln = Ln. Therefore, an increase in Ksl reduces
ls; intuitively, a larger Ksl increases the wage rate of Southern unskilled labor rendering
o¤shoring less attractive. This reduction in ls triggers a market size e¤ect as shown in (23).
As a result, a larger capital stock in the South also leads to skill-biased technical change
(i.e., Nh=Nl increases). We summarize this result in Proposition 3.
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Proposition 3 When the equilibrium features o¤shoring, an increase in Southern capital
stock Ks leads to skill-biased technical change. When the equilibrium does not feature o¤-
shoring, an increase in Southern capital stock Ks also leads to skill-biased technical change.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Although the comparative statics of Nh=Nl with respect to Ks are the same regardless
of whether or not the equilibrium features o¤shoring, the intuition behind the two scenarios
is quite di¤erent. In the absence of o¤shoring, the e¤ect of Ks on Nh=Nl operates through
the price e¤ect. Suppose there is a zero supply of high-skill labor Hs in the South. Then,
a larger capital stock Ks expands only the production of labor-intensive goods Y sl , which
leads to a positive price e¤ect by increasing Ph=Pl and consequently skill-biased technical
change. A similar intuition also applies to the more general case of Hs=Ls < Hn=Ln, which
we have assumed throughout the analysis.
3.2 Complete patent protection in the South
In this subsection, we consider complete patent protection in the South (i.e.,  = ), and the
rest of the model is the same as in the previous subsection with o¤shoring in labor-intensive
goods. In this case, the steady-state ratio of Nh=Nl can be expressed as21
Nh
Nl
=
"
1  

"
Hn + Hs
Ln + Ls
(" 1)# 11 (1 )(" 1)
, (27)
where " > 1 and 1 (1 )(" 1) > 0 because  > (" 2)=(" 1). Equation (27) shows that
under o¤shoring, a decrease in Ls leads to an increase in Nh=Nl as before; however, Nh=Nl is
independent of Ks in this case. Intuitively, although a larger Ks reduces o¤shoring ls, any
decrease in ls is o¤set by an equal increase in unskilled labor ls devoted to production in the
South. Because of complete Southern patent protection, the market size e¤ect of unskilled
labor depends on Ls regardless of its distribution in ls and ls. Therefore, despite its e¤ect
on o¤shoring ls, a larger Southern capital stock Ks no longer leads to skill-biased technical
change under complete patent protection. We summarize these results in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 Under complete patent protection in the South, a decrease (an increase)
in the supply of Southern unskilled labor Ls leads to skill-biased (unskill-biased) technical
change. However, changes in Southern capital stock Ks have no e¤ect on Nh=Nl.
Proof. See (27).
21Equation (27) can be derived by setting  =  in (A11) of Appendix A.
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3.3 Incomplete patent protection in the South
In the previous subsections, we show that whenever o¤shoring is present, a decrease in un-
skilled labor leads to skill-biased technical change regardless of whether Southern patent
protection is zero or complete. Therefore, one can conjecture that the same result also ap-
plies to the general case of incomplete Southern patent protection; however, we are also
interested in quantitative implications. Therefore, in this subsection, we calibrate the model
for the general case of incomplete Southern patent protection in order to provide an illustra-
tive numerical investigation on the e¤ects of changes in unskilled labor and capital in China
on the direction of innovation in the US. The model features the following set of parame-
ters f"; ; ; ; ; ; Ls; Hs; Ln; Hn; Ks; Kng.22 We either consider standard values of these
parameters or calibrate them using empirical moments in China and the US.
For the discount rate, we set  to a standard value of 0.03. For the parameter on labor
share, we set  to the lower value of 0.4 in China because it also implies a more realistic
markup n = 1=(1   ) = 1:67. According to the Ginarte-Park index of patent rights, the
level of patent protection in China from 1995 to 2005 is on average 63.5% of that in the
US, so we set s   1 = 0:635(n   1), which implies  = 0:30. We normalize Ls to unity
and compute Hs using data on the share of population in China with at least some tertiary
education (i.e., Hs=(Hs +Ls), which is on average 4.6% from 1995 to 2010 according to the
Barro-Lee dataset on education attainment). Similarly, we compute Ln andHn using data on
the share of population in the US with at least some tertiary education (i.e., Hn=(Hn+Ln),
which is on average 51% from 1995 to 2010 according to the Barro-Lee dataset) and the
relative population size between China and the US (i.e., (Hs + Ls)=(Hn + Ln), which is on
average 4.44 from 1995 to 2009 according to the Penn World Table). We normalize Kn to
unity and compute Ks using data on the relative GDP between China and the US (i.e.,
(PhY
s
h +PlY
s
l )=(PhY
n
h +PlY
n
l ), which is on average 0.47 from 1995 to 2009 according to the
Penn World Table).23 For the remaining parameters f"; ; g, we consider a range of values
of " 2 f2:0; 2:2; 2:4g. For each value of ", we calibrate the values of f; g using the following
moments. For the o¤shoring parameter, we calibrate  using the value of processing trade
surplus in China as a share of GDP (i.e., wsl l
s=(PhY
s
h +PlY
s
l ), which is on average 4.7% from
1995 to 2008).24 Finally, we calibrate the value of  using the college premium in the US
(i.e., wnh=w
n
l , which is on average about 1.7 from 1995 to recent time). Table 1 reports the
calibrated parameter values.25
Table 1: Calibrated parameter values
"      Ls Hs Ln Hn Ks Kn
2:0 0:16 0:49 0:03 0:4 0:3 1 0:05 0:12 0:12 0:14 1
2:2 0:16 0:48 0:03 0:4 0:3 1 0:05 0:12 0:12 0:14 1
2:4 0:16 0:48 0:03 0:4 0:3 1 0:05 0:12 0:12 0:14 1
22It can be shown that the calibration and simulation of the interested variables are independent of .
23There are two versions of data on China in the Penn World Table, and we compute our values using
both versions and taking an average of the two values.
24Data on the value of processing trade surplus in China is obtained from Xing (2012). Data on Chinas
GDP is obtained from United Nations: National Account Main Aggregates Database.
25We provide the equilibrium expressions for calibration in an unpublished appendix (see Appendix B).
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We consider two policy experiments. First, we reduce the supply of unskilled labor in the
South and examine its e¤ect on Nh=Nl and wnh=w
n
l .
26 Second, we increase the capital stock
in the South and examine its e¤ect on Nh=Nl and wnh=w
n
l . Table 2 reports the results.
27
Due to skill-biased technical change, either a decrease in Ls or an increase in Ks would raise
the skill premium in the North. The magnitude of the changes is sensitive to the value of "
(i.e., the elasticity of substitution between skill-intensive and labor-intensive goods) as is well
known in the literature. Suppose we consider a moderate value of " = 2:2 as our benchmark.
Then, we nd that a 1% decrease in the supply of unskilled labor Ls in China would lead to
a 0.8% increase in the skill premium in the US, whereas a 1% increase in the capital stock
Ks in China could lead to a 0.6% increase in the skill premium in the US. If we consider
a larger value of " = 2:4, then a 1% decrease in unskilled labor (1% increase in capital) in
China would raise the skill premium in the US by as much as 3.7% (2.0%).
Table 2a: 1% decrease in Ls
" 2:0 2:2 2:4
Nh=Nl 0:7% 1:4% 4:6%
wnh=w
n
l 0:1% 0:8% 3:7%
Table 2b: 1% increase in Ks
" 2:0 2:2 2:4
Nh=Nl 0:5% 0:8% 2:3%
wnh=w
n
l 0:3% 0:6% 2:0%
To have a better understanding of the e¤ects of Ls and Ks on the skill premium wnh=w
n
l ,
we derive28
wnh
wnl
=
"
1  

"=(" 1)
Hn + Hs
Ln + Ls
 1=(" 1) Hn + 

Hs
Ln + 

Ls + ls(   )=
!#
, (28)
where   ("  1) =[1  (1  )("  1)] > 0 because " > 1 and  > ("  2)=("  1). Suppose
we consider the special case of complete Southern patent protection (i.e.,  = ). Then, (28)
simplies to
wnh
wnl
=
"
1  

"=(" 1)
Hn + Hs
Ln + Ls
(" 2)=(" 1)#
. (29)
Under complete Southern patent protection, a decrease in Ls raises the skill premium wnh=w
n
l
if and only if " is greater than a threshold value of 2. Under incomplete Southern patent
protection (i.e.,  < ), our numerical results indicate that this threshold value of " can be
slightly below 2. Another interesting implication from (29) is that under complete Southern
patent protection, wnh=w
n
l is independent of K
s. In other words, an increase in Ks raises the
skill premium if and only if  < , under which Ks a¤ects wnh=w
n
l through o¤shoring l
s.
26It is useful to note that wnh=w
n
l = w
s
h=w
s
l in this model.
27The results in Table 2 are expressed as percent changes in Nh=Nl and wnh=w
n
l .
28We provide the derivations in an unpublished appendix (see Appendix B).
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4 Conclusion
In this study, we have analyzed how economic development in China could a¤ect skill-
biased technical change in the US. In our analysis, we have assumed that the supply of
skilled/unskilled labors and the capital stock are exogenous. In reality, they are all en-
dogenous variables. In the case of China, their changes are mainly driven by economic
development. As the economy develops, the share of skilled labor in the work force and
the stock of physical capital increase. As a result, the smaller supply of unskilled labor and
the larger supply of physical capital reinforce each other in triggering skill-biased technical
change through o¤shoring. Furthermore, if the reduction in the supply of unskilled labor
also increases the skill premium in both the US and China as in our simulation results,29
then there would be more incentives for skill acquisition in both countries increasing the
supply of skilled labor and triggering further skill-biased technical change. Therefore, we
believe that our results are robust to the endogenous accumulation of physical and human
capital. However, allowing for these additional features would signicantly complicate our
analysis, so that we leave these interesting extensions to future research.
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Appendix A
In this appendix, we provide proofs of the propositions. Before we proceed to the proofs,
it would be helpful to rst present the following preliminary derivations. The prices of
intermediate inputs do not depend on z 2 fl; hg, so that pnl;t = pnh;t = nqnt = pnt and
psl;t = p
s
h;t = 
sqst = p
s
t . The conditional demand functions for labors are
wsl;t =
Pl;t
1   (l
s
t )
 1  xsl;t1  (Nl;t)2 , (A1-a)
wnl;t =
Pl;t
1   (l
n
t + l
s
t)
 1  xnl;t1  (Nl;t)2 , (A1-b)
wsh;t =
Ph;t
1   (h
s
t)
 1  xsh;t1  (Nh;t)2 , (A1-c)
wnh;t =
Ph;t
1   (h
n
t )
 1  xnh;t1  (Nh;t)2 . (A1-d)
The conditional demand functions for intermediate inputs are
xsl;t = (Pl;t)
1
 (pst)
  1
 (lst )(Nl;t)
1 
 , (A1-e)
xnl;t = (Pl;t)
1
 (pnt )
  1
 (lnt + l
s
t)(Nl;t)
1 
 , (A1-f)
xsh;t = (Ph;t)
1
 (pst)
  1
 (hst)(Nh;t)
1 
 , (A1-g)
xnh;t = (Ph;t)
1
 (pnt )
  1
 (hnt )(Nh;t)
1 
 . (A1-h)
When o¤shoring takes place in equilibrium (i.e., lst > 0), the marginal productivity of do-
mestic unskilled labor must be proportional to the marginal productivity of foreign unskilled
labor subject to the o¤shoring cost ; therefore, we have wnl;t = w
s
l;t. Using this condition
along with the above rst-order conditions, we obtain
pnt
pst
= 

1  . (A2)
Because the nal-goods sector is perfectly competitive, prot maximization implies
Ph;t
Pl;t
=
1  

 
Y nh;t + Y
s
h;t
Y nl;t + Y
s
l;t
!  1
"
. (A3)
The production functions (7)-(10) can be re-expressed as
Y sl;t =
lst
1   (Pl;t)
1 
 (Nl;t)
1
 (pst)
  1 
 ; (A4-a)
Y nl;t =
lnt + l
s
t
1   (Pl;t)
1 
 (Nl;t)
1
 (pnt )
  1 
 ; (A4-b)
Y sh;t =
hst
1   (Ph;t)
1 
 (Nh;t)
1
 (pst)
  1 
 ; (A4-c)
Y nh;t =
hnt
1   (Ph;t)
1 
 (Nh;t)
1
 (pnt )
  1 
 : (A4-d)
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Taking into account (A4) together with the labor-market-clearing conditions, (A2) and (A3)
imply
Ph;t
Pl;t
=

1  

 "
1+(" 1)

Nh;t
Nl;t
  1
1+(" 1)

Hn + Hs
Ln + Ls
  
1+(" 1)
, (A5)
which serves as the rst condition that we will use to solve for the steady-state equilibrium
values of fNh;t=Nl;t; Ph;t=Pl;t; lstg. The other two conditions can be derived as follows.
The R&D conditions imply that Vz;t =  and thus _Vz;t = 0 when _Nz;t > 0 for z 2 fl; hg.
Using (19), we obtain
rt =
nz;t + 
s
z;t

. (A6)
The equilibrium bias is Vh;t=Vl;t = (nh;t + 
s
h;t)=(
n
l;t + 
s
l;t) = 1. Also using (13), (16), (A1)
and (A2), we derive
Ph;t
Pl;t
=

Nh;t
Nl;t
 (1 ) 

Hs +Hn


(Ls   lst) + Ln + lst
! 
. (A7)
Finally, the capital-market conditions give rise to30
Ph;t
Pl;t
=

Nh;t
Nl;t
 10@

1=(1 )K
n
Ks
+ 

lst + L
n   1=(1 )Ls Kn
Ks
1=(1 )Hs K
n
Ks
 Hn
1A , (A8)
noting (A1) and (A2). The steady-state equilibrium values of fNh;t=Nl;t; Ph;t=Pl;t; lstg are
determined by (A5), (A7) and (A8) along with the resource constraint lst 2 [0; Ls].
Proof of Proposition 1 . Using (A7), one can show that if the following inequality holds,
Ph;t
Pl;t
>

Nh;t
Nl;t
 (1 ) 

Hs +Hn


(Ls   ls) + Ln + ls
! 
, (A9)
then Vh;t =
 
nh;t + 
s
h;t

=rt =  and Vl;t < , which imply that _Nh;t > 0 and _Nl;t = 0:
Combined with (A5), this inequality can be rewritten as
Nh;t
Nl;t
<

1  

 "
1 (1 )(" 1)

Hn + Hs
Ln + Ls
  1
1 (1 )(" 1)  

Hs+Hn


(Ls ls)+Ln+ls
 1+(" 1)
1 (1 )(" 1)
,
(A10)
where ls 2 [0; Ls] is given by its steady-state equilibrium value. Thus, following Acemoglu
and Zilibotti (2001), we have shown that there is only one type of innovation o¤ the steady
30To derive (A8), we use
Ks
Kn
=
xsh;tNh;t + x
s
l;tNl;t
xnh;tNh;t + x
n
l;tNl;t
=
Nl;t (Pl;t)
1
 (pst )
  1
 (lst )(Nl;t)
1 
 +Nh;t (Ph;t)
1
 (pst )
  1
 (Hs)(Nh;t)
1 

Nl;t (Pl;t)
1
 (pnt )
  1
 (Ln+lst )(Nl;t)
1 
 +Nh;t (Ph;t)
1
 (pnt )
  1
 (Hn)(Nh;t)
1 

:
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state, and the economy monotonically reaches the balanced growth path in nite time. On
the balanced growth path, Nh;t and Nl;t grow at the same rate. The same proof can be
applied to an economy starting from Nh;t=Nl;t larger than the right-hand side of (A10).
In the rest of this proof, we consider the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Using (A5), (A7) and (A8), we derive the following two conditions that can be used to solve
for the steady-state equilibrium values of fNh=Nl; lsg.
Nh
Nl
=

1  

 "
1 (1 )(" 1)

Hn + Hs
Ln + Ls
  1
1 (1 )(" 1)
 


Hs +Hn


(Ls   ls) + Ln + ls
! 1+(" 1)
1 (1 )(" 1)
(A11)
 F (ls),
Nh
Nl
=


1  
 "
" 1

Hn + Hs
Ln + Ls
 1
" 1
0@


1
1  Kn
Ks
+ 

ls + Ln    11  Kn
Ks
Ls

1
1  Kn
Ks
Hs  Hn
1A
1+(" 1)
(" 1)
(A12)
 G(ls).
F (ls) is (weakly) decreasing in ls because   . As for G(ls), it depends on the value of ;
specically, there are three parameter spaces to consider: (a)  > [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1 , (b)
[(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1  <  < [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1 ,31 and (c)   [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1 .
Recall that [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1  > [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1  because Hn=Ln > Hs=Ls.
Case (a): If  > [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1 , then G(ls) is strictly increasing in ls guaranteeing
the uniqueness of the equilibrium (if it exists). To establish its existence, we need to ensure
that F (ls) and G(ls) cross within ls 2 [0; Ls]. First, F (0) > G(0) because F (0) > 0 and
G(0) < 0 as a result of Ln    11  Kn
Ks
Ls < 0. Second, F (Ls) < G(Ls) would also hold if and
only if  is su¢ ciently large.
Case (b): If [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1  <  < [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1 , then G(ls) would be de-
creasing in ls. Furthermore, G(ls) would be positive if and only if ls <

1=1 Kn=Ks Ln=Ls
1=1 Kn=Ks+

Ls.
As ls !

1=1 Kn=Ks Ln=Ls
1=1 Kn=Ks+

Ls, G(ls) = 0 < F (ls). Finally, G(0) > F (0) would also hold
if and only if  is su¢ ciently large; in this case, it can be shown that G(ls) crosses F (ls)
exactly once from above.32
Case (c): If   [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1 , then  < [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1  implying that

1
1  Kn
Ks
Hs Hn < 0 in G(ls). In this case, G(ls) must be nonpositive for ls 2 [0; Ls] because
Ln    11  Kn
Ks
Ls  0; therefore, an o¤shoring equilibrium does not exist.
Proof of Propositions 2 and 3. In the following proofs, we consider the special case of
zero patent protection in the South. Setting  = 0 in (A11), we obtain
F (ls) =

1  

 "
1 (1 )(" 1)

Hn + Hs
Ln + Ls
  1
1 (1 )(" 1)

Hn
Ln + ls
 1+(" 1)
1 (1 )(" 1)
, (A11-a)
31It can be shown that if  = [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1  , then ls =

1=1 Kn=Ks Ln=Ls
1=1 Kn=Ks+

Ls instead of being
determined by (A12).
32On the other hand, if G(0) < F (0), then the model may feature multiple equilibria, which we rule out
by imposing a su¢ ciently large  to ensure that G(0) > F (0) holds.
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and G(ls) is the same as in (A12). The unique steady-state equilibrium values of fNh=Nl; lsg
are implicitly determined by solving these two equations. We need to consider the two
parameter spaces under which o¤shoring exists: (a)  > [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1 , and (b)
[(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1  <  < [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1 .
Case (a): If  > [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1 , then G(ls) is increasing in ls. In this case, an
increase in Ks shifts up G(ls) and gives rise to a larger equilibrium value of Nh=Nl.
Case (b): If [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1  <  < [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1 , then G(ls) is decreasing
in ls and crossing F (ls) exactly once from above given a su¢ ciently large . In this case, an
increase in Ks shifts down G(ls) and also gives rise to a larger equilibrium value of Nh=Nl.
We summarize these results in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1: If  > [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1 , then an increase inKs would lead to an increase
in Nh=Nl.
Using (A11-a) and (A12), we derive the following condition that implicitly determines
Nh=Nl.
Hn
Hs


1
1  Kn
Ks
+ 

Nh
Nl
  1 (1 )(" 1)
1+(" 1) (A13)
= 


1
1  Kn
Ks
  Hn
Hs

Nh
Nl
 " 1
1+(" 1)
+ 
1
1  Kn
Ks


1 
 "
1+(" 1)  Hn
Hs
+ 
 1
1+(" 1) (Ln + Ls)
(" 1)
1+(" 1) .
Once again, we need to consider the two parameter spaces under which o¤shoring exists: (a)
 > [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1 , and (b) [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1  <  < [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1 .
Case (a): If  > [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1 , then the right-hand side of (A13) is increasing
in Nh=Nl, whereas the left-hand side of (A13) is always decreasing in Nh=Nl. In this case, a
decrease in Ls shifts down the right-hand side and gives rise to a larger equilibrium value of
Nh=Nl.
Case (b): If [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1  <  < [(Hn=Hs)(Ks=Kn)]1 , then the right-hand
side of (A13) is also decreasing in Nh=Nl and crosses the left-hand side exactly once from
below. In this case, a decrease in Ls shifts down the right-hand side and also gives rise to a
larger equilibrium value of Nh=Nl. We summarize these results in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2: If  > [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1 , then a decrease in Ls would lead to an increase
in Nh=Nl.
Zero-o¤shoring equilibrium: Now we consider the case of   [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1 ,
under which o¤shoring does not take place in equilibrium (i.e., ls = 0). In this case, we
derive three equilibrium conditions,
Ph
Pl
=

1  

 "
1+(" 1)

Nh
Nl
  1
1+(" 1)
 
(Hs) (ps) (1 )= + (Hn) (pn) (1 )=
(Ls) (ps) (1 )= + (Ln) (pn) (1 )=
!  
1+(" 1)
,
(A14)
Ph
Pl
=

Hn
Ln
  
Nh
Nl
 (1 )
, (A15)
pn
ps
1=
=
Ks
Kn
(Ln) + (Ph=Pl)
1= (Hn)(Nh=Nl)
1=
(Ls) + (Ph=Pl)
1= (Hs)(Nh=Nl)1=
, (A16)
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which correspond to (A5), (A7) and (A8), respectively. Substituting (A15) and (A16) into
(A14), we obtain
Nh
Nl
=

1  

 "
1 (1 )(" 1)

Hn
Ln
 1+(" 1)
1 (1 )(" 1)
 
Ls

Ks
Kn

1+
Nh
Nl
(1 )
+Ln

Ls
Ln
+H
s
Hn
Nh
Nl
1 
Hs

Ks
Kn

1+
Nh
Nl
(1 )
+Hn

Ls
Ln
+H
s
Hn
Nh
Nl
1 
! 1
1 (1 )(" 1)
.
(A17)
Because Hn=Ln > Hs=Ls, the right-hand side is monotonically increasing and concave in
Nh=Nl, which ensures the unique existence of a steady-state equilibrium. One can show that
the right-hand side is increasing in Ls and Ks, so we can prove the following lemma by
means of a usual graphical analysis.
Lemma 3: If   [(Ln=Ls)(Ks=Kn)]1 , then there would be no outsourcing in equilib-
rium (i.e., ls = 0); in this case, an increase in Ls or Ks leads to an increase in Nh=Nl.
Finally, note that Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 prove Proposition 2, whereas Lemma 1 and
Lemma 3 prove Proposition 3.
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Appendix B: Not for publication
In this appendix, we provide the equilibrium expressions for calibrating the model: (a) o¤-
shoring as a share of GDP wsl l
s=(PlY
s
l +PhY
s
h ), (b) the relative GDP (PlY
s
l +PhY
s
h )=(PhY
n
h +
PlY
n
l ), and (c) the skill premium w
n
h=w
n
l . Note that (5) implies
Pl =
 
" + (1  )"

Ph
Pl
1 "! 1" 1
, (B1-a)
Ph =
 
"

Ph
Pl
 (1 ")
+ (1  )"
! 1
" 1
. (B1-b)
Then, using the capital-market condition for s and (A1), we obtain
ps = (Ks) 

(Pl)
1
 (ls)(Nl)
1
 + (Ph)
1
 (Hs)(Nh)
1


. (B2)
As for PlY nl + PhY
n
h , we use (A4) to obtain
PhY
n
h + PlY
n
l =


1 Kn
1   (Pl) (Nl)

HsLn  HnLs + (Hn + Hs) ls

1
1 KnHs  KsHn

, (B3)
noting (A2) and (A8). Using (A1), we obtain
wsl =
 (Pl) (Nl)
1  

PlNl
ps
 1 

. (B4)
Using (A4), (A8) and (B2), we obtain
PlY
s
l + PhY
s
h =
Ks
1   (Pl) (Nl)

HsLn  HnLs + (Hn + Hs) ls

1
1 KnHs  KsHn

. (B5)
Using (B2), (B4) and (B5), we obtain
wsl l
s
PlY sl + PhY
s
h
=



1
1 KnHs  KsHn

ls
Ks (HsLn  HnLs + (Hn + Hs) ls) . (B6)
Using (B3) and (B5), we obtain
PlY
s
l + PhY
s
h
PhY nh + PlY
n
l
=
Ks


1 Kn
. (B7)
Finally, using (A1), we obtain
wnh
wnl
=

Ph
Pl
Nh
Nl
 1

. (B8)
By (A5) and (A7),
Ph
Pl
Nh
Nl
 1

=
 
1  

"=(" 1)
Hn + Hs
Ln + Ls
 1=(" 1) Hn + 

Hs
Ln + 

Ls + ls(   )=
!! " 1
1 (1 )(" 1)
:
(B9)
Then, (B8) and (B9) imply (28).
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